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In this paper, we outline a new configurational framework linking different models of
corporate governance to their associated ethical, strategic management and strategic
human resources management (SHRM) policies and practices. We draw on this
framework to analyze the role played by HRM and leadership in the rise and spectacular
failure of the Royal Bank of Scotland, the Scottish headquartered financial services
group, which grew to be one of the largest and most successful banks in the work prior
to the global financial services crisis (GFC) but had to be rescued by British taxpayers
following a failed acquisition during the GFC. Drawing on published accounts and
interviews with senior RBS HR staff, we also analyze how a post-crisis shift in
corporate governance, ethics and strategy is shaping organizational climate and HR
policies at the bank to provide the HR function with a greater opportunity to exercise an
influence on the corporate governance regime. However, the global nature of the
financial services industry, the needs to satisfy financial markets and the desire of the
UK government to return RBS to private sector ownership has placed strict limits on the
potential for the emergence of a stakeholder model of corporate governance and HR,
which many critics anticipated would be one of the few positive outcomes of the GFC.
Keywords: corporate governance; financial services; strategic human resource
management
Introduction
The 2007–2009 global financial services crisis (GFC) has caused financial services
organizations, particularly the banking sector in developed economies, to suffer from an
unprecedented decline in their reputations with the general public (Smallman, McDonald
and Muller 2010; Reputation Institute 2011). This decline, driven by public perceptions of
poor corporate governance and ethics, human resources management (HRM) and
leadership (Cooper 2009), and films such as ‘Inside Job’ and ‘The Flaw’, matters a great
deal because financial services companies rely heavily on their reputations to generate new
business (Reputation Institute 2011). Consequently, some academics and companies are
beginning to look beyond the dominant shareholder value model of corporate governance
that characterized American and British financial services from the 1980s onwards
(Davis 2009) to alternatives to rebuild their reputationswith key stakeholders. On this issue,
a choice is typically posited between shareholder value and stakeholder theory
(Freeman 1984), in which there has been a resurgence of interest (Agle et al. 2008;
Jensen 2011). However, we argue that this choice is incomplete because it is too restrictive.
Other models are available that are less polarized between the competing tenets of
shareholder value and stakeholder theory (Aguilera, Filatochev, Gospel and Jackson 2008)
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and are potentially more capable of capturing the reality of corporate governance in
financial services. We also argue that current corporate governance and strategic HRM
(SHRM) theory is incomplete because it glosses over the relationships between these
different models of governance and organizational/SHRM variables. Thus, we believe this
present study helps readers to gain insights into what alternatives need to be incorporated
into choices among governance models and how they relate to business ethics, SHRM,
organizational climate governance and the role of HR. We do so by outlining a simplified
version of a new configuration model (Martin, Farndale, Paauwe and Stiles 2011) and show
how it can shed light on the current crisis in financial services in the UK drawing on a case
study of the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), which was the most dramatic of a series of
British bank failures following the GFC in 2008. This case highlights the strengths and
limitations of our configuration framework, so making a contribution to theory and practice
in SHRM generally and the financial services industry in particular.
A framework for linking SHRM to corporate governance in the global financial
services sector
Recent corporate governance research has attempted to broaden its focus from shareholder
behavior and board composition, etc. to understand the ‘mechanisms (used) to ensure that
executives respect the rights and interests of company stakeholders, and that those
stakeholders are held accountable for acting morally and responsibly for the generation,
protection and distribution of wealth invested in the firm’ (Aguilera et al. 2008, p. 475;
Aguilera and Jackson 2010). It is clear from cases in the UK financial services sector that
some companies and executives have failed to act responsibly and/ or ethically in
balancing their wealth creation and wealth protection roles, in much the same way as their
American counterparts (Filatochev 2005; Davis 2009; Smallman, et al. 2010; Kerr and
Robinson 2011). Moreover, trends in executive pay have resulted in debates over
distributional issues, especially over whether extraordinarily high bonuses for senior
executives and traders can be ethically and economically justified (Core and Guay 2010;
Filatotchev and Allcock 2010). Yet, with only a few exceptions (e.g. Legge 1995/2005;
Spector 2003; Farndale, Paauwe and Boselie 2010; Filatochev 2005; Pfeffer 2010;
Boxall and Purcell 2011), the mainstream HRM literature has been relatively silent on
these topics. Instead, it has had an arguably myopic focus on economic performance
(Ghoshal 2005; Boselie, Brewster and Paauwe 2009; Pfeffer 2010) and the employee
attitudes, behaviors and HR governance models that underpin it (Wood 2009).
To help fill this gap, we introduce a simplified version of a new framework (see
Table 1), which classifies literature linking corporate governance to SHRM according to
answers to a general question concerning the future of market economies and the
applicability of the US business model to global financial services companies (Davis 2009;
Whitley 2009), the nature of corporate leadership (Hamel 2007), ‘sustainable’
organizations (Pfeffer 2010) and the nature of SHRM (Boselie et al. 2009; Huselid and
Becker 2011). This question is: what is the correct balance that organizations and their
boards should seek between economic performance and social legitimacy (Reich 2007;
Davis 2009)?
The traditional answer has been framed as a choice between two options. The first can be
characterized by Milton Friedman’s (13 September 1970) classical dictum that companies
maximize social welfare by using resources and engaging in activities that maximize profits
over time, so long as they do so ‘in open and free competition without deception or fraud’
(p. 4). This position is closely linked with the traditional shareholder value model of
G. Martin and P.J. Gollan3296
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corporate governance,which emerged in the 1980s. Thismodel drewon the economic tenets
of agency theory, which proposed the use of ‘high powered’ incentives to align managerial
agentswith shareholders (Jensen andMeckling 1976), and on transaction cost theory and the
efficient markets hypothesis to justify market-based forms of governance structures
(Williamson 1985). In essence, these were arguments for the importance of equity capital
and largely unregulated financial markets that dominated economic thinking and board
governance until the GFC (Donaldson and Preston 1995; Davis 2009).
The second option, stakeholder theory, which has its origins in criticisms of unfettered
free markets (Daily, Dalton and Canella Jnr 2003; Ghosal 2005; Laplume, Sonpar and Litz
2008; Cooper 2009), suggests that sustainable economic performance of organizations
rests on company boards’ role modeling virtuous behavior by meeting changing societal
expectations, thus creating ‘soulful’ (Wirtenberger 1969; Davis 2005), ‘altruistic’
(Jones, Felps and Begley 2007) or ‘sustainable’ organizations (Pfeffer 2010). These
theories raise social obligations, especially to employees and society, to the same (or even
greater) plane as short-term economic performance. In essence, this is an argument for
patient capital and for greater regulation of financial markets and sustainability
(Ferrary 2009). This position is closely linked to a stakeholder perspective on governance
and organizations, which is found in certain varieties of capitalism and seeks to widen the
scope of claims made on the firm to include any group or individual who can affect or is
affected by an organization (Freeman 1984).
However, while much of the governance research has been restricted to comparing
these two options, recent work has argued that other choices or perspectives are possible.
Thus, Clarke (2007) has discussed an enlightened shareholder value perspective, which
became popular post-Enron. Though still committed to shareholder value, this perspective
was adopted by organizations as a means of rescuing or re-imaging the traditional
shareholder value model. This model reflects executives’ desires to temper pure self-
interested, egoist ethics with Kantian moral duties to treat people with respect (Greenwood
2002), to see them as a key resource in strategic competition to be invested in and to be
managed through the application of ‘soft power’ (Courpasson 2000) and sophisticated
HRM (Guest et al. 2003).
More recently, Aguilera et al. (2008) have proposed a fourth option – a context-
dependent model. Thus, firms may choose different corporate governance approaches for
different parts of their business or at different times, depending on how successful or
acceptable they are in different contexts. This is a more contextualized hybrid model,
based on a relativist ethical position and, an embedded-in-context strategic management
approach (Whittington 2000). It also draws on a range of SHRM, organizational climate,
and leadership approaches, often using a mixture of soft and hard power and HRM
techniques.
We believe our configuration framework contributes to the literature by showing how
these four options have different implications for SHRM (including leadership
philosophies and approaches), the governance of organizational climate, and the role
and governance of the HR function in financial services. However, this relationship is a
reciprocal one. Just as the shareholder value model of corporate governance, which
dominated financial services in the US and the UK from the 1980s until recently, has had
implications for talent management by selecting, developing and rewarding executives
whose values fit an organizational rationale based on maximizing share price, these same
executives did a great deal to create performance-oriented organizational climates and
corporate governance frameworks in their own image (Adams, Licht and Sagiv 2011). It
should be noted that these configurations are ideal types in the sense of being theoretical
The International Journal of Human Resource Management 3299
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abstractions rather than normative models, allowing reference to a more complex reality to
be established for the purposes of contrast and comparison of ideas for research, in this
case in the financial services sector. So, can such a framework help us analyze the
implications of the GFC for SHRM and vice versa?
Developments in the UK financial services sector: RBS as a case in point
To assess the relevance of our framework to the GFC, we have used a single case study
approach, drawing on an interpretivist philosophy (Burrell and Morgan 1982) and
qualitative research methods using semi-structured interviews. We have also used archival
methods to provide a historically grounded case, from a review of academic literature
mentioning RBS, press reports and official RBS documentation. The case has been chosen
because it represents the most high-profile impact of the GFC on the UK banking sector
and one of the most spectacular corporate failures in the British economic history. In 2007,
RBS was one of the world’s most successful private sector banks ranking fourth in the
world in Tier 1 capital but had to be rescued by the British government in 2008. At the time
of writing (November 2011), it was 83% owned by the UK taxpayer and has slipped to
14th in the Tier 1 rankings. The case also provides a real-time, ‘soft-test’ of our framework
in Table 1 by examining: (1) the extent to which the case can be analyzed and explained by
changes from one configuration to another, thus validating the integrity of three of our
configurations – traditional shareholder value, enlightened shareholder value and
stakeholder models – as analytical abstractions, and (2) the conditions under which a
context-dependent configuration might provide a more useful explanatory insight.
In-depth interviews were conducted with eight former and current senior RBS HR
executives, who have provided unique insights. Data analysis combined an inductive focus
to identify categories of meaning with deductive theoretical questioning (Richardson and
Kramer 2006). The interrogation of literature and interviews addressed the impact of
changes in ownership on ethics, strategy and SHRM in RBS. During the interviews, we
asked questions relevant to our framework concerning leadership, organizational culture
and SHRM approach prior to the crisis, how these related to governance, ethics and
strategy, whether the overall configuration changed because of lessons learned or
government directives, and if so how and why?We also wanted to know whether the HRM
function had become stronger or weaker as a result. Interviews were transcribed and
analyzed for key categories of meaning that emerged from interviewees’ accounts of the
changing nature of HRM in the company. Four such categories became apparent: the
attribution of impact by different CEOs on organizational culture and HRM; the focus on
‘strategy execution’; changes in performance management and human capital manage-
ment; and changes in leadership development.
RBS prior to the GFC
RBS was founded in 1727 in Edinburgh but remained a small local bank until the 1990s. It
was firmly rooted in the Scottish economy and its executives were part of the Scottish
establishment (Kerr and Robinson 2011), pursuing paternalistic welfare policies toward
employees. The model of governance resembled an early version of enlightened
shareholder value, with shareholding narrowly held by local private investors, which more
or less pertained for 250 years. However, deregulation of financial services in the UK in
the mid 1980s made RBS a prime candidate for acquisition by ambitious banks and other
financial institutions. As a consequence, the board, led by chairman Sir George
Mathewson, embarked on a ‘high-leverage’ strategy by running lower than industry
G. Martin and P.J. Gollan3300
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average levels of capital to fund an expanding portfolio of new loans and off-balance sheet
investments, an approach that ultimately contributed to its failure along with many other
financial institutions (Nelson 2010). Such a strategy was built on hiring more
entrepreneurial managers deemed capable of fulfilling the Mathewson vision of expansion
in Britain and overseas, and diversification into related financial services. Reflecting on
this strategy, one former senior manager suggested it depended on ‘stretching every pound
and running with fewer deposits in the core banking business than was comfortable to
generate revenues and investment capital’. However, in line with much academic criticism
(Core and Guay 2010), another commentator suggested it was more the work of ‘spivvy’
managers responding to huge incentives than to follow risk-adjusted strategies.
The fulfillment of this ‘growth-through-acquisition’ strategy was placed in the hands
of CEO Fred Goodwin, who had been informally recruited at a party by Mathewson in
1988 as deputy CEO. He led a well-documented takeover of the London-based NatWest in
1990, a bank nearly three times its size, earning him a near-heroic reputation among the
global financial community (Kennedy, Boddy and Paton 2006). Effectively, RBS ran
down its capital to ‘dangerously low levels’ to purchase NatWest in a bitterly contested
battle. This acquisition was intended to increase revenue and profits by leaving the
NatWest brand and branch network intact while undertaking aggressive cost cutting,
job losses and rationalization, especially in integrating back office functions and a
proliferation of IT systems into the RBS platform or ‘manufacturing division’ (Gratton and
Ghosal 2005). RBS’s integration model worked spectacularly well, with the acquisition of
NatWest producing $4 billion of enhanced profits and success in merging two bank
cultures (Groysberg and Sherman 2008). It also proved to be the making of Fred
Goodwin’s high-profile reputation.
The NatWest purchase and integration became a prototype for a series of later overseas
and domestic acquisitions (Nohria and Weber 2005). During this period, RBS also
developed a greater presence in investment banking, a trajectory that became common
among retail banks seeking rapid growth. The move into investment banking, primarily
through its US subsidiary RBS Greenwich Capital, which led to taking on riskier loans in
the American sub-prime market during the period 2005–2007, was also to prove
significant in RBS’s subsequent decline.
The final acquisition was the Dutch bank, ABN AMRO Holdings, in October 2007, a
bid that RBS led as part of a consortium with Fortis and Banco Santander. This purchase
was the largest ever in financial services history and was intended to help RBS diversify
further into (1) retail banking in the US, Asia Pacific, Chinese and Indian markets, and
(2) build greater capability in banking services and financial solutions to major corporate
and financial institutions, investment banking and international financial management.
As a consequence, RBS became the world’s fifth largest bank by market capitalization and
largest corporate and institutional bank in Europe employing 171,000 people in more than
50 countries, so achieving Mathewson’s and Goodwin’s vision of a global bank
(Groysberg and Sherman 2008; Martin and Hetrick 2010).
Until the ABN acquisition, the company’s senior management team was widely
applauded by the global financial community. However, the financial press and some RBS
institutional shareholders began to question the sustainability of, and motives underlying,
the board’s acquisition strategy and the lack of short-term returns to shareholders.
Moreover, specific criticisms were made about the decision to go ahead with the purchase
of ABN when LaSalle, one of the Dutch bank’s key lines of businesses in the USA and an
important justification used by the RBS board for pursuing ABN in the first place, was sold
by to another buyer. The RBS board’s response to these criticisms was to push ahead
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regardless, although they publically stated that ABN would be the last major acquisition
and that RBS would concentrate on organic growth in the future and on improving the
cost-to-income ratio that impacted directly on returns to shareholders.
Leadership, organizational culture and HRM in RBS during the growth period
By combining published accounts with certain themes raised by interviewees, a coherent
storyline emerges, which focuses on the interrelationships between strategy, leadership,
culture and HRM, of RBS’s success until 2007. These relationships embraced not only a
traditional shareholder value model in terms of ethical underpinnings, focus on hard HRM
and leader centricity, but also elements of the enlightened shareholder value configuration
that characterized its earlier years, for example in the focus on development and
engagement. The specific features of leadership and organization culture that were used to
account for success were (1) Goodwin’s directive, micro-leadership style, which held
executives personally accountable and touched every aspect of organizational culture,
(2) ‘strategy execution’, embodied in the strapline ‘making things happen’, (3) performance
management and reward systems, symbolized by a sophisticated human capital
management system that signified a focus on hard data and (4) later on, a major investment
in leadership development of the top 300 executives to reinforce certain key messages
concerning the importance of leadership for innovation. The success that followed led to a
growing internal and external confidence in the personalized, directive leadership style and
decisionmaking of Goodwin himself and, to a lesser extent, his senior executive team. Such
over-attributions of organizational success to individual personality rather than situations
have been a core feature of the transformational leadership literature, resulting in what has
been labeled a ‘romancewith leaders’ (Meindl and Erlich 1987; Grint 2010). One senior HR
manager summed up this ‘fundamental attributional error’ as follows:
He (Goodwin) was probably given too much credit on the way up and came in for too much
criticism on the way down . . . he came to symbolize all that was wrong with banking and the
credit crunch. (Interviewee 1)
Nevertheless, there is little doubt that the financial press and the UK government were
influential in shaping external and employee perceptions of Goodwin’s impact on the
organization. Among other accolades, he was named the Best Bank CEO by Reuters and
was knighted by the UK government in 2004. Goodwin’s personal impact was also a
dominant recurring theme in interviewee accounts, though interviewees also reflected on
its longer term dysfunctional consequences.
Leadership in RBS – the Goodwin imprimatur
Perhaps the most important symbols of the RBS leadership approach were the ‘signature’
morning meetings instituted by Goodwin and his attention to detail. These have been well
documented by Gratton and Ghoshal (2005), who described how these meetings signaled
Goodwin’s intent to micro-manage a global organization by holding senior executives
directly accountable for strategic and operational results. This ‘signature process’ involved
Goodwin and his executive teammeeting everymorning, either face-to-face or through video
conferencing. A senior member of the RBS board explained the nature of these meetings:
Fred loves the morning meeting. It is his chance to put his imprint on whatever is
happening . . . . Fred is more rigorous as a manager than anyone I have ever met. He is
extraordinarily demanding. For example, in the morning meetings, he will look at a budget
and go straight to page 23 and ask about it. He is very rigorous about apparently small things
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and this pervades the company. People say, ‘If Fred sees this, what would he say?’ (Gratton
and Ghoshal, p. 55)
While Gratton and Ghoshal argued these meetings had great symbolic value in reinforcing
the bank’s core values of respect, egalitarianism, straight-talking and practical
action-orientation with ‘accountability at the heart of how the morning meeting is
conducted’ (p. 56), a senior HR interviewee offered a more hybridized account of
Goodwin’s style and the impact of these meetings on creating a paternalistic
organizational culture and centralized decision making:
When I joined the organization it felt quite ambitious. Externally it was perceived as
aggressive but internally it didn’t feel like that at all. It felt paternalistic in many
ways . . . there was a desire to look after people in a controlling sort of way, a kind of
parent/child relationship, we-know-best way . . .Decision making was also quick, up and
down, which I think worked well when the organization was relatively small . . . but less so
when the organization began to grow rapidly (reference to the ABN takeover).
(Interviewee 3)
High energy and the focus on strategy execution were also common themes in
interviewees’ descriptions of RBS culture (see also Gratton 2008). One interviewee
attempted to capture the energy redolent in RBS:
There was an awful lot of talk about improving ‘clock speed’ of anything and everything –
from mowing the lawns outside to doing acquisitions . . . . There was a culture of
responsiveness, people moved fast around the building, there was a culture of speed –
running, moving, fast . . . something that Linda Gratton noticed in her book. (Interviewee 6)
Interviewees also accounted for success by focusing on the ability of the company to
create a machine-like bureaucracy that slipped into gear to implement centrally taken
strategic decisions. Once a decision was taken to acquire a new business, questions on
strategy were played down and the speed and rigor of ‘execution’ played up:
In line with the making things happen strapline, you know, I guess this was where RBS was
so successful . . . decisions were taken centrally . . . the vast majority of people were just
pushed into execution, the machine just cut in. And because RBS had such great processes,
we could focus on execution . . . the role of senior managers and, indeed, my role was on
execution, rather the extent to which you were able to shape or influence strategy . . . and that
came from a very focused CEO who had a clear view of what the strategy should be.
(Interviewee 7)
I’ve never known an organization like it. There was an obsession with execution . . .where a
logo – making things happen – actually reflected how an organization operated (laugh).
(Interviewee 3)
One important issue that emerged during interviews was the nature of strategic objectives
handed down to the HR function. Again, these focused on the growth strategy and on
managing the pervasive cost to income metric, which were critical to profitability and
shareholder value though this connection was not always made. A senior HR executive
explained:
The cost to income ratio was always being talked about in HR. There was a phrase that was
used extensively – ‘managing the jaws’. Yes share price and shareholder value got a mention,
but these were created by growth, new business opportunities, by the cost to income ratio . . . .
However, it never felt like cost control, no that’s the wrong word, there was a big focus on
investments, it was never about cutting costs. (Interviewee 2)
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A focus on measurement
Interviewees emphasized evidence-based management, metrics and performance
outcomes as a key feature of the organizational culture, pointing to numerous stories of
Goodwin’s attention to detail and pre-occupation with measurement and his impact on
other managers.
he had an obsessive attention to detail, and his managers copied his style to get on.
For example, he would ask about the (evaluation) scores on Course code xyz (in the new
Business School). What’s the average score, what’s the trend? . . . He wanted to know why we
were using a case on Tesco on the (executive development) courses . . . I saw a hand-written
note from Fred, querying this . . . and his acolytes would mirror Fred’s style. (Interviewee 8)
There was a focus on data. Data was everything. I remember Fred coming along to an HR
conference and saying I have only three words to say to you – attrition, attrition, attrition. He
wanted to know why there were 23–24% attrition rates in turnover in the first year
(of employment in a particular division). (Interviewee 6)
The human capital strategy
This last quotation shows the importance of human capital on strategy. RBS’s HR team
became known internationally as a benchmark for excellent HR practice through its
sophisticated approach to human capital metrics and leadership development. Much has
been written about RBS’s human capital strategy in practitioner-oriented articles (e.g.
Groysberg and Sherman 2008), which represented the apogee of rationality applied to the
measurement of leader performance and impact on organizational effectiveness. Annual
employee, surveys, regular ‘pulse’ surveys and benchmarking of employee engagement
with other financial services and global high-performing companies were developed in the
late 1990s, revealing different drivers for employee engagement in different regions.
However, the focus on leadership and its impact on engagement, customer service and cost
to income ratios was common. A Leadership Index, using standardized metrics across the
RBS Group, revealed a significant correlation between leadership performance and
outcome measures of performance. This combination of measures was turned into a
Human Capital Toolkit to help managers and HR business partners ‘diagnose issues,
develop interventions, share best practices and measure the effectiveness of their people
strategy . . . ’ (Groysberg and Sherman 2008, p. 10) and rolled out into their international
retail banking sector. These Harvard academics claim it is one of the most impressive
online tools anywhere linking people management, sales, customer service and financial
performance metrics. Importantly, managers were measured, made accountable and
rewarded on how well they met key metrics, including employee engagement and
satisfaction. The metrics also provided the basis for talent management segmentation and
performance assessment, which became extensively used for career development
purposes.
Interviewees also suggested that ‘delivery’ and ‘getting things done’ were the most
valued leadership competence.
What RBS was always good at was making things happen, integration, meeting targets, big
program management, with a set of measure deliverables . . . the key competence was a
burning drive for results, and that was by far most important. (Interviewee 1)
Thus, RBS’s approach to human capital management became one of its signature
processes and the benchmark for UK companies in all sectors to follow. Data from the
constant surveys of employees also highlighted how success, supported by investment in
people, was leading to a growing confidence in the organization:
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RBS as an organization became very confident organization from its execution of the NatWest
acquisition, and you could see why. It was a very successful acquisition . . . . Having been on
the NatWest side, I would say they did incredibly well in integration . . . . What came with that
was investment . . . . People drew on the confidence and energy of the organization.
(Interviewee 5)
During the period 2003–2007, employee perceptions of key indicators rose significantly,
particularly leadership, internal beliefs about the external image of RBS, innovation,
communication, respect and diversity, and employee engagement. They also enjoyed high
‘favourability’ scores on employment security, working relationships and recognition and
reward against the global financial services norm, a benchmarking measure developed by a
consulting firm. Significantly, however, employee engagement scores were below the
financial industry norm, interpreted internally as problems with leadership style in the
organization, to which we return in the following sections. Nevertheless, the general thrust
of the metrics provided substantial evidence that the overall HR strategy was effective and
improving over time.
A focus on leadership development
As already noted, the metrics pointed to leadership quality being the most important driver
of employee, customer, sales and financial performance. For example, beliefs by
employees that their business was well managed ranked as the most important factor in
explaining variations in employee engagement scores in different countries (Martin and
Hetrick 2010). Thus, providing leadership development became a key element in RBS’s
talent management strategy. Consequently, it established a state-of-the-art business school
in 2006 in Edinburgh to develop its most promising senior executives, in which Goodwin
took a close interest because he believed he could use it to further shape the corporate
culture. RBS established links with leading US schools, such as Harvard, to deliver
executive education programs rather than UK schools. This was intended to reflect the
global nature of the company and to meet the increasing aspirations of its ‘top talent’
segment to be associated with a major global company. A senior executive explained in an
interview conducted in 2006:
RBS is now a global organization. It needs to ensure that it has the best senior execs to work
internationally . . . Executive education must have a global perspective . . . . The Scottish
business schools are too UK-centric . . . . Our senior executives expect to work with the best
schools in the world. (Interviewee 2)
Reflections on RBS during its growth period: the problems of shareholder value
Reflections on leadership
By 2007, it became clear that this romance with Goodwin’s leadership style and
perceptions of his positive impact were waining. Reflecting an important theme in the
leadership literature concerning the dysfunctional consequences of managerial hubris,
narcissism and executive overconfidence (Hiller and Hambrick 2005; Shipman and
Mumford 2011), the collective self-confidence in RBS, built on Goodwin and his
executive committee’s reputation for making ‘the right calls’, was increasingly seen
internally as collective arrogance. Interviewees linked it to the centralized, directive,
micro-management style of Goodwin and his executive team and impact on organizational
culture, and on a general unwillingness of his direct reports ‘to speak up to power’:
I would say that confidence became more arrogance, with each successive acquisition . . . the
one thing that concerned me was the growing arrogance, and that generated a lot of personal
agendas, which started to override team, or organizational or functional agendas . . . . I think
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the personal agendas came from the attributes that were rewarded, things like ‘burning drive
for results’, things like ‘creating tension to catalyse change’. These were key aspects of the
behavioural leadership model, which were seen as probably more important than some of the
other, perhaps softer management or leadership skills. (Interviewee 5)
Another interviewee suggested that this was the point he became convinced that confident
judgment became arrogance:
If you look at the later stages . . . the ABN takeover, the transaction originally had the LaSalle
piece in it . . . that fell through, but by that stage RBS was so close to the deal and had made
such a big thing about beating Barclays, it still went full steam ahead. Analysts were saying
pull away, but they didn’t because of that arrogant streak . . . . it seems like they just wanted the
deal done . . . I think to show it had the strength and ability to say, sort of, look, we’ve done it
again, despite what people say. (Interviewee 7)
Published and interviewee accounts also highlighted the corrosive impact the morning
meetings had on leadership style throughout the company. For example, a BBC (18
October 2011) analysis proposed that the morning meetings were Goodwin’s method of
maintaining tight control behavior and to set the tone and boundaries for legitimate
leadership in RBS. According to one interviewee, ‘ritual humiliation’ was seen as a ‘right
of passage’. Two former senior HR managers described how these meetings negatively
influenced leadership style throughout the organization:
I would sum up the RBS leadership style in a few words, it was a bullying culture . . . it was
very command and control, get things done, really carrot and stick approach. This came
directly from Goodwin himself. This was his style, which his senior management team
emulated . . . in one sense they had to get on. People conformed to Goodwin’s style. It was
considered OK to bully people; his behavior legitimized it. (Interviewee 8)
It became quite a cool thing to do, to be seen to be seen in a meeting, to be quite abrasive, to be
seen at times perhaps, you know, to push people back, to stand people down . . . I think at times
it bordered on bullying. (Interviewee 6)
Other interviewees, however, pointed to the lack of ‘responsible followership’ (Kellerman
2008) in standing up to power, thus helping sustain Goodwin’s personal impact:
‘Outside of the senior management group, there was probably limited ability to challenge
decisions . . . I think from Fred and his team, but in reality Fred himself. His direct reports were
clearly influenced by Fred’s own agenda. He was very capable, very clever, but he was also
feared. (Interviewee 6)
It was fantastically paradoxical. It was a mono-culture all built around Fred Goodwin, he was
the driver . . . . He wanted people to challenge him, but when they didn’t come forward, I guess
stand up to him, he just ‘steam-rollered’ on.
This resulted in further negative aspects of strong cultures built around a single leader or
small leadership team:
Coming from (a highly respected professional services firm) I found RBS to be very insular
from the rest of the world outside, a kind of ‘we’ve always done it this way, so why change’
culture. This came from the very top . . . . I don’t think it was as entrepreneurial as people made
out. (Interviewee 8)
Reflections on performance management, metrics and HR
These reflections on the dysfunctional consequences of the overall approach to
management in RBS also extended to the performance management system, the human
capital system and to rewards.
Performance management was very strong in the Bank, but it was very subjective . . . I would
say there was a great deal of misuse of the ‘Bell Curve’ (the practice of forced distribution to
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ensure that performance reflected a normal distribution), so that people fitted the curve. It
didn’t really matter about absolute levels of performance, managers were forced into relative
performance. Nor did behaviours matter, what counted was achieving targets and that is what
people were rewarded for! (Interviewee 8)
This attention to detail and measurement was seen positively and negatively.
The HR engagement survey was treated very seriously, every year each manager was rated on
engagement and the scores were literally placed on the door. Managers as they trooped into
the auditorium could see the red, amber and green scores on the door, and knew who would be
in for a hard time. One of the real paradoxes in RBS was Fred (Goodwin) shouting – ‘you
will be good to your people’ (laughter). Maybe that explains the high response rates.
(Interviewee 4)
RBS after GFC: a more enlightened shareholder value configuration?
Reasons for failure
As previously noted, RBS entered into a joint venture with Fortis and Santander in 2007 to
acquire the Dutch bank, ABN AMRO, which had presence in 53 countries. The bid was
successful and they acquired ABN for $106 billion in October 2007. However, there were
early warning signals when some analysts portrayed as ‘price-aggressive’ and overpaying
for the deal. Nevertheless, RBS had gained confidence through its history of successful
acquisitions and expected the ABN takeover to be equally successful if they applied
the same strategic integration formula. Unfortunately, the purchase took place just when
the GFC began to bite, which, according to most analysts, was the beginnings of a
‘perfect storm’ facing RBS. In the summer of 2007, negative signs of a recession were
clearly visible as a consequence of the ‘credit crunch’ associated with the sub-prime
mortgage-backed securities (collateralized debt obligations) in the USA. ABNwas heavily
exposed to these toxic US securities, for which RBS was subsequently criticized for not
exercising due diligence.
The RBS response to this crisis was to undertake a £12 billion rights issue, at the
time the largest in the history of any company. This move turned into a source of
humiliation for CEO Fred Goodwin and his board, and led to further questions over
the justification of the ABN AMRO deal. The rights issue failed, so after decades of
success in the UK banking history and having become one of the biggest banks of the
world, RBS went into free fall in 2008 and within no time reached the brink of
collapse. The UK government had to step in with massive cash injections, so the Bank
rapidly became effectively state owned. In October 2008, the Bank’s board asked
Sir Fred Goodwin to retire to avoid being sacked. The bank was then taken over by
the UK government, which intervened to shore up the collapsing UK financial system;
RBS alone recorded losses of £24 billion in February 2009. Sir Fred Goodwin and
Sir Tom McKillop (the Chairman), along with other senior bankers caught up in the
crisis, were questioned by a Treasury Select Committee of MPs at Westminster in
February 2009. These bankers were forced to apologize for their behavior, admitting
that the purchase of ABN Amro was a ‘bad mistake’ despite their defense that it was
the credit crunch that had been the cause of failure. (The Scotsman, 11 February
2009). McKillop admitted they had overpaid for ABN, reflecting that they had ‘bought
at the top of the market’, and what they had paid ‘was not worth it’. One of the major
causes for RBS’s failure, and indeed all of the British banks, was deemed to be the
executive bonus culture that encouraged overly risky behavior, a point born out in
recent research.
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A change in leadership style
A new CEO, Stephen Hester, was appointed in early 2009 because of his previous
experience in leading a turnaround at another large UK financial services firm. His
appointment also led to a new board being appointed, with only two former directors
remaining by May 2009. This executive group is currently faced with trying to keep
talented people in the business and restoring employees’ faith in senior managers while
trying to reduce the company’s overall size, restore it to profitability and to private sector
ownership. EU requirements following the GFC led to RBS selling off its insurance
companies, 318 retail banking branches and part of its investment banking business over a
four-year period. The consequences were significant job losses, with 19,700 being made
redundant since October 2008, of which 13,700 were in the UK. As a result, employee
engagement levels ‘tanked’, as one interviewee commented, which were poorest in the
lines of businesses most affected, for example, insurance and investment banking.
Moreover, there was a widespread feeling among many employees that the senior
leadership had let them down (CIPD 2009). The, former HR Director, explained:
I think a number of people felt let down. Also, we had very high employee share ownership
and a lot of people are unhappy about that [because the share price crashed]. There are a lot of
people who were hurt, whose pride was hurt, and many people were disappointed in the
leadership. (CIPD, 3 Deccember 2009, p. 2)
Thus, Hester and his board sought to signal a more appropriate leadership style and
organizational culture. They developed a group-wide strategy comprising five new
themes: a 15% return on equity; top-tier competitive position in leading customer
franchises, proportionate use of balance sheet risk and funding, organic growth, and a new
customer charter (CIPD 2009).
Leadership and HRM in a new environment
The RBS board and the HR function have faced significant challenges in rescuing the
failed bank and keeping staff engaged so that they work toward its revival. The RBS
corporate sustainability report, which records key ‘scores’ from their human capital
survey, showed a significant decline of 12% and 16% in job satisfaction and engagement,
and employment security in 2008–2009. Our interviews, however, showed that lessons
have been learned that resulted in changes taking place. Nevertheless, their story was of
continuity as well as change, reflecting cultural inertia in certain parts of the business and
tensions in what is regarded as a temporary change in ownership, since both the UK
government and the RBS board are keen that the company returns to private ownership as
soon as is practicable. Equally important, however, RBS had developed a reputation for
excellent HR practice prior to the GFC. As one interviewee succinctly put it:
It is easy to say that before crisis, RBS was this and after crisis, it was that, but that is too
simple. Obviously things went wrong, but there was and still is a lot of very good practice in
HR and that hasn’t changed overnight. (Interviewee 1)
We reflect on these changes raised by our HR interviewees who remained with the
business after the crisis, the most significant of which were in leadership style and its
impact on organizational culture, best characterized as a move from the use of ‘hard’ to
‘soft’ power (Courpasson 2000). Hester and his board were seen to signal a new culture of
open and regular communication so that employees could engage with senior leaders over
the RBS’s future. The new CEO immediately introduced a system of conferences and calls
between himself and his most senior managers, requiring them to cascade information
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throughout the organization. This change was informed by data that highlighted failings in
the previous leadership culture according to the human capital metrics. As one senior HR
manager explained:
It was very obvious from the data that the leadership style was very delivery focused, we had
the data to prove it, we brought it along to meetings, saying if you compare us with global high
performing companies, our leaders are going to need more collaboration, more influencing
skills. They are going to need the ability to, you know, manage tensions. This is the gap and
we have put in a big program of work to fill that gap, to send signals that other things are
important . . . (following prompt) a more balanced scorecard approach. We saw a spike in
(name of division) where they had a spike around ‘burning drive’, which we have been
working on a lot. (Interviewee 3)
These changes in leadership were partly attributed to the role modeling impact of Hester,
and his chairman, Sir Philip Hampton, who provocatively declared that RBS was ‘paying
big salaries to staff who are not worth it’. The former Group HR director, in a published
interview in 2009 suggested that:
Stephen has a very different style to Fred [Goodwin] . . . . A little bit less formal, a bit more
relaxed. Both were interested in results, but he is much more focused on communication and
performance management. (CIPD, 3 December 2009, p. 1)
Another senior HR manager pointed to the importance of restoring faith in senior
leadership:
Change starts from the top, this is always necessary. It isn’t just the Chief Executive, but
undoubtedly there is a different role modeling going on at very senior levels and that gets
cascaded down into the organization . . . . The messages from the Group Executive now are
much more about the need for new behaviours, we never used to talk about behaviours, we
never really used to talk about values . . .we are starting to talk about these a little bit more
now. (Interviewee 2)
Changes in values, talent management and leadership
However, these changes have been unevenly spread throughout the organization. Attesting
to the importance and strength of local subcultures, another interviewee explained:
What we began to do in other parts of the business, still hasn’t affected (x division) . . . So if I
look at the leadership index in other divisions, there is still a spike around a burning drive for
results. (Interviewee 2)
Changes were also evident in the emphasis on values supporting RBS’s new customer
charter and its social responsibility pronouncements. Again these changes were attributed
to the new board of RBS. However, the following insight also highlights a key dilemma
faced by the company in meeting its stakeholder obligations:
What we also talk about more is the core purpose of the organization and the social good it
does. But it’s talked about in a fairly subtle way because there is still a challenge over how you
present the organization externally at the moment . . . I think we need to fix things first, sort
things out before you start these sorts of things . . . (asked to elaborate). Well I mean at group
level it’s not the right thing to be coming up with values because we are in the middle of a five-
year plan, to get to the point where we have to stand alone as a business. Until you’ve got that,
well that’s what we’ve got to deliver for the taxpayers and quite rightly so, to get their money
back essentially, and that’s got to be our number one priority, but there is also recognition . . . a
very clear signal that there is a different style of leadership, a more open style, a more
collaborative approach, you know, a more considered, thoughtful approach. (Interviewee 3)
These changes were reflected in new approaches to performance management
emphasizing the means of achieving results as well as the results themselves. Such a
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change is indicative of a change in business ethics from egoism to a Kantian morally
correct duty to treat people as ends in themselves. It is also backed by the influence of new
external regulation from the Financial Services Authority (FSA):
(Following probe) To give you some examples, we are using behaviours for performance
assessment . . . . It’s not just about what you’ve delivered but how you’ve delivered it.
There is a big focus on performance management and the need for personal development for
leaders – we have 360 degree for that, so that behaviours measured through the appraisal
system . . .All executives and direct reports are to get a 360 degree. (Interviewee 3)
It is different now, yes, I think things like the FSA regulations require our executives to have
. . . have completed a performance review. This is just good practice, but now we have to
evidence it. (Interviewee 2)
According to interviewees, the focus on a new approach to talent management and
leadership development has also been noticeable. One of the most important of these
changes in policy has been a move away from recruiting externally to developing people
internally:
We also have a new leadership framework for behaviours, what we expect of our leaders, and
people are being measured against them. That’s a key change, but it depends on the business.
I don’t see it as an enormous change from previously in the division I was previously in, but in
other parts of the business, it is a big change. (Interviewee 5)
Another documented change was a greater focus on innovation, with leadership
development in the business school being used to generate new ideas, especially in retail
banking. Sessions have been introduced into the leadership development program, which
have led to new revenue streams. Leadership development has also focused on creating
more effective leaders at all levels in the organization by helping them gain the skills to
teach, based on the belief that you cannot know something until you have to teach it
(Mostyn 2010).
HR as ‘an un-indicted co-conspirator’
Finally, an internal and external debate has taken place over HR’s role in RBS being
‘part of the problem’ or even helping cause the problem (Spector 2003). The former Group
HR Director, in a published interview of HRMagazine (October 2010) answered his many
HR critics in the blogosphere:
I’m not absolving myself totally . . . (but) I can’t see what HR could have done. Lack of money
was not an HR issue, the portfolios our businesses kept was not an HR issue; none of them
were. I wasn’t running the bank . . . the CEO makes the decisions, not me. People think HR
runs companies. I say stop getting carried away. HR is a support function, no more, no less
important than sales or IT. HR critics are way ahead of themselves . . .He (Stephen Hester,
when he took over) said he didn’t see HR as part of the problem. (2010, p. 1)
He further asserted:
Culture issues were secondary issues, not primary ones . . .HR isn’t responsible for the culture
of the business; the board and its customers are. It’s the business environment that sets the
culture . . . I’ve always thought pay in this sector is mad . . . a lot of staff were angry with the
leadership and their bonuses and rightly so. (2010, p. 2)
However, some interviewees suggested that the ability of the HR function to absolve itself
from blame and for responsibility for organizational culture may be changing, since Hester
has already gone on record to say that ‘Shareholders have raised concerns about our
ability to keep and motivate good people . . . (this is) our single greatest problem’.
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Thus, as one interviewee stated that while in some divisions it was asked to hold up a
mirror to senior executives and encouraged to do so, there was a feeling that the new senior
management team was asking the function to become guardians of the corporate
conscience:
The HR function wasn’t too blame for what had happened in the past, or wasn’t
powerful enough to prevent excesses, but now it was being asked to be more responsible
and accountable its role for hold up the mirror, in some parts of the business at least.
(Interviewee 2)
Conclusions
In this study, we have outlined a new framework linking corporate governance to SHRM
and used it to analyze the case study of RBS as an illustration of the GFC’s impact in the
UK financial services sector. We believe that both shed new light on a wider range of
corporate governance configurations than the traditional shareholder value-stakeholder
dichotomy that dominates the literature, and on the relationships between these alternative
models of governance and their ethical, strategic, SHRM, leadership, organizational
climate and HR governance concomitants in financial services and other sectors.
The configuration model has helped us to map out and analyze relationships among these
variables and to show how changes in governance regimes often move in tandem with
changes in ethics, strategy, SHRM and climate governance, and the role of HR. However,
as the case of RBS shows, these configurations are only theoretical abstractions that do not
quite capture the complex reality found in cases of the large-scale organizational change
brought about by the GFC in UK banks.
One possible reading of the case is of RBS changing from a traditional shareholder
value configuration to enlightened shareholder value after GFC, which for some people
represents one of the few positive outcomes of the GFC. The Mathewson–Goodwin era
can be characterized by a traditional shareholder value-hard power model that was in tune
with the financial economics of the period, the opportunities created by deregulation of
financial services and the strategy to grow through acquisition to satisfy shareholders and
executive aspirations for a global business. The organization pre-GFC was characterized
by egoist ethics, a focus on measurement, human capital and leader centricity, with the HR
function playing a limited role at board level. The case also reveals a weakness in the HR
function’s ability to help leaders to reflect on their leadership style and organizational
culture to bring about change.
After GFC, it is possible to read into the case a more enlightened shareholder value
configuration, with senior leadership, organizational climate and SHRM more consistent
with a corporate governance regime and change in ethics that was demanded by a change
in ownership to the UK taxpayer. RBS was forced to respond to its wider obligations,
which was reflected in a new customer charter emphasizing obligations to customers, the
community and employees. It was also used as an arm of government policy to change
banking culture, especially the bonus culture and what the government regards as
excessive pay, with overall pay levels being held to the median for the industry. The case
suggests that the RBS board has sought to portray an image of itself as stewards of the
wider interests represented within the firm, especially those of taxpayers and government.
There is substantial evidence that the egoist ethics of self-interest have been tempered with
the appointment of Hester and his management team, the exercise of soft power, and a
form of sophisticated HRM privileging employee engagement, extensive communications
and involvement. Arguably, even this short-term change in ownership has resulted in
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lessons being learned on the problems of over-confident, heroic leadership style, a need for
HR professionals to ‘speak up to power’ by helping leaders reflect on their style and ethical
behavior (Shipman and Mumford 2011), and over distributional issues such as bonuses
and pay (Core and Guay 2010).
However, contrary to the predictions and hopes of some academics and practitioners,
the GFC has not resulted in the end of shareholder value and its replacement by a
stakeholder model of governance in this case due to lack of a receptive context for such
radical change. Despite what some had expected from left-of-center government
ownership, the demands on banks such as RBS to compete globally in both product and
executive labor markets and, in this case, the government’s desire to return the company to
private shareholding ensured that no significant attempt was made to enforce a pure
stakeholder configuration on RBS. Thus, the case might also be interpreted as providing
evidence of a context-dependent configuration in two ways. First, the intent of the UK
government to return RBS to the private sector as soon as practicable and the extent to
which RBS and financial services in the UK more generally are part of a global industry
rather than a nationally bounded one suggest important contextual limitations to the
application of stakeholder theory in this case. Second, internal factors, including
the business orientation and the natural instincts of the new leadership team at RBS to
promote ‘shareholderism’ as an ideology governing decisions (Adams et al. 2011) and
shareholder value as a model of governance, are also important influences. Third, RBS has
had to promote an image of hard power and commercialism externally, especially to
financial markets, the business press and, perversely, to government, while exercising soft
power internally and paying large bonuses to key professional and mobile groups. Thus,
different parts of the business and segments of the workforce are likely to be managed very
differently, which is also evident from the case. This, less optimistic, reading suggests that
the GFC is likely to have little significant impact in the long term on RBS or most other
financial services organizations that remain in business.
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